Why do we need the doha round

This linkage has come be known as the "exchange rate" between the two negotiations. Following on the Potsdam summit, a draft modality paper was released on July 17, , authored by the NAMA negotiating chairman. This document, and subsequent revisions released in February, May, July, August, and December , has formed the basis of the Geneva level negotiations.

This paper sought to reconcile the positions of the parties to move the negotiations forward; as such, it faced mostly criticism from the diverse negotiating groups. These various texts have reflected some narrowing of positions over time, but they should not be considered to reflect the present state of agreement in the negotiations.

Following the July Ministerial, the chairman revised his text again to reflect areas of "convergence" in the negotiations, while admitting that not all members accepted this convergence.

Countries choosing coefficient z, which would lead to the lowest tariff cuts under the formula, would not avail themselves of these flexibilities.

The use of these flexibilities has been further complicated by the so-called "anti-concentration clause," which provides that the flexibilities available to developing countries shall not be used to exclude full chapters of the harmonized tariff schedule HS from full formula reductions.

Both the United States and the EU have been adamant that the flexibilities should not be used in a way to exclude whole industrial sectors from formula cuts, as reflected in the 2 digit HS chapter.

Meanwhile, developing countries have opposed expanding the anti-concentration clause beyond the level of full chapters, as agreed by all members at the Hong Kong Ministerial. Negotiations have been heated on which products to cover and the extent of participation i.

The United States has insisted that major developing countries participate in the sectorals, while developing countries have countered that the original negotiating mandate makes such negotiations voluntary. The December draft posits the still unresolved question of, "how and when to define the commitment of Members to participate in sectorals without altering the non- mandatory character of these negotiations.

As noted above, the industrial market access talks also encompass negotiations on the reduction of non-tariff barriers NTBs. The draft text includes several sectoral proposals concerning NTBs for chemical products; electronics; electrical safety and electromagnetic compatibility; labeling of textiles, clothing, footware, and travel goods; and automotive products.

The text also includes a proposal for a mechanism to resolve disputes over specific NTBs as they arise. The ITA is a plurilateral agreement providing for the elimination of tariffs on information and communications technologies ICT covered by the agreement. ITA Members agree to eliminate tariffs and other duties and charges on products covered by the agreement, however, the agreement does not include disciplines on non-tariff measures affecting ICT products.

While the ITA has been considered a success in liberalizing trade in covered ICT products, members have not been able to agree to expand its product list over the years. For this reason, as well as its lack of coverage of digital products and lack of disciplines on non-tariff measures, it is widely considered to be outdated by some members, including the United States.

Informal talks began in May to expand and update the agreement. Thus far, talks have centered on which additional products to cover and how or whether to include disciplines on reducing non-tariff barriers on ICT. International Trade Commission released a report compiling a draft list of ICT products considered for duty-free treatment in the negotiations. Three development issues are most noteworthy.

One pertains to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection. A second deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing countries. A third addresses problems that developing countries were having in implementing current trade obligations.

Before the Doha meeting, the United States claimed that the current language in TRIPS was flexible enough to address health emergencies, but other countries insisted on new language. On December 16, , then-TRIPS Council chairman Eduardo Perez Motta produced a draft that would allow countries that lack the manufacturing capacity to produce medicines to issue compulsory licenses for imports of the medicines. The United States sought a limit on the diseases that would be covered by the chairman's text, but other countries refused this initiative.

The United States decided to oppose the chairman's draft and unilaterally promised not to bring a dispute against any least-developed country that issued compulsory licenses for certain medicines. One concern of the pharmaceutical industry was that the medicines sent to the developing country might be diverted instead to another country. To address this problem, it was suggested that the medicines be marked so that they can be tracked. Another concern was that more advanced developing countries might use the generic medicines to develop their own industries.

For this problem, it was proposed that countries voluntarily "opt-out," or promise not to use compulsory licensing. Voting in the General Council, member governments approved a decision that offered an interim waiver under the TRIPS Agreement allowing a member country to export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licences to least-developed and certain other members. An accompanying statement represented several "key shared understandings" of Members regarding the Decision, including the recognition that the decision should be used to protect public health and not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives, and the recognition that products should not be diverted from the intended markets.

The statement listed a number of countries that either agreed to opt out of using the system as importers or agreed that they would only use the system in national emergencies or extreme urgency.

At the Hong Kong Ministerial, members agreed to a permanent amendment to incorporate the Decision, which will become effective when it is ratified by two-thirds of the member states. To date, 46 countries including the 27 members of the EU have ratified the agreement.

Developing countries claimed that the developed countries were not negotiating in good faith, while developed countries argued that the developing countries were unreasonable in their proposals. Developing countries claim that they have had problems with the implementation of the agreements reached in the earlier Uruguay Round because of limited capacity or lack of technical assistance. They also claim that they have not realized certain benefits that they expected from the Round, such as increased access for their textiles and apparel in developed-country markets.

They seek a clarification of language relating to their interests in existing agreements. At the Doha meeting, the Ministerial Declaration directed a two-path approach for the large number of remaining issues: 1 where a specific negotiating mandate is provided, the relevant implementation issues will be addressed under that mandate; and 2 the other outstanding implementation issues will be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies.

Outstanding implementation issues are found in the area of market access, investment measures, safeguards, rules of origin, and subsidies and countervailing measures, among others. The first WTO Ministerial Conference, which was held in Singapore in , established permanent working groups on four issues: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, trade and investment, and trade and competition. These became known as the Singapore issues. These issues were pushed at successive Ministerials by the European Union, Japan and Korea, and opposed by most developing countries.

The United States was lukewarm about the inclusion of these issues, indicating that it could accept some or all of them at various times, but preferring to focus on market access.

After further negotiations during , a compromise was reached in the July Framework Agreement: three of the Singapore issues government procurement, investment, and competition were dropped and negotiations would begin on three specific areas of trade facilitation: to clarify and improve GATT Article V Freedom of Transit , Article VIII Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation , and Article X Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.

Trade facilitation aims to improve the efficiency of international trade by harmonizing and streamlining customs procedures such as duplicative documentation requirements, customs processing delays, and nontransparent or unequally enforced importation rules and requirements. The talks have thus far revolved around the scope and obligations of the new disciplines. Trade facilitation is often mentioned as a deliverable in a "scaled-back" Doha agreement, or as a stand-alone agreement acceptable to all parties.

Discussions have also occurred concerning the technical assistance and trade capacity building needed by developing countries to implement any subsequent agreement. Developing countries are in the process of assessing their own trade facilitation status, and what it will take to bring them up to international standards with the help of customs experts from organizations such as the World Bank and the World Customs Organization.

Developed countries, including the United States and the European Union, favor the negotiation of a concrete rules-based system with appropriate accountability, while some developing countries prefer optional guidelines with "policy flexibility. However, congressional leaders were highly critical of this concession by U. The Doha Ministerial Declaration also called for clarifying and improving disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and both the Ministerial Declaration and the Implementation Decision have special provisions on trade remedies and developing countries.

In addition to trade remedies, the Declaration calls for clarifying and improving WTO disciplines and procedures on regional trade agreements. The Declaration identified two phases for the work on trade remedies: "In the initial phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting practices that they seek to clarify and improve in the subsequent phase.

The United States has primarily been on the defensive in the rules talks. Many countries have attacked the use of antidumping actions by the United States and other developed nations as disguised protectionism.

However, many developing countries are now using antidumping actions themselves, which may goad some countries to reexamine the necessity for discipline. Yet, no agreements have been reached, even on what is to be negotiated.

They have made numerous proposals, and in essence their proposals would reduce the incidence and amount of duties. Many of their proposals would require a change in U.

Although the EU is a major user of trade remedies and not a member of the "Friends" group, it has agreed with some of the group's proposals.

The United States itself has sought some changes in the WTO rules, submitting papers on antidumping proposals on issues such as transparency, foreign practices to circumvent duty orders, and the WTO standard used by dispute panels in reviewing national applications of trade remedy laws.

The United States also has submitted proposals on subsidies, such as expanding a list of prohibited subsidies and imposing disciplines on support to sales of natural resources. A draft modalities paper was released on November 30, A key feature of this draft was language allowing the use of zeroing in certain antidumping AD calculations. While the United States expressed disappointment that the text did not go far enough in legitimizing the practice, several countries including the "Friends of Antidumping" group and others were harshly critical of the draft text as rolling back Appellate Body decisions on zeroing.

The November draft modalities paper also put forth a proposed modality on fisheries subsidies. The proposal would ban some subsidies outright such as those boost fishing capacity or encourage over-fishing. Exceptions would be allowed for subsidies associated with operations of fisheries management programs and for certain special and differential treatment for developing countries, provided that they adopt fisheries management programs.

The extent of this special treatment and the treatment of subsidies for small-scale fishing in both developed and developing countries remained unresolved. At the end of the Uruguay Round, trade ministers called for a full review of WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures within four years after entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO. That deadline, January 1, , passed without a review being completed.

At Doha, trade ministers continued to call for a review of dispute rules. They stated that the negotiations should be based on work done so far and on any additional proposals.

They set a deadline of May They directed that these DSU negotiations would be separate from the rest of the negotiations and would not be a part of the single undertaking.

Members are examining nearly all of the 27 Articles in the DSU. In early April , the chair of the working group circulated a framework document that included over 50 proposals.

There was some dissatisfaction that the document needed more focus. On May 16, , the chair issued another text that was accepted by most countries. The United States and the EU favored additional reforms that were not a part of the text. For example, the United States has called for open public access to proceedings, and the EU had sought a roster of permanent dispute panelists. The Ministerial Declaration included several provisions on trade and environment.

Among the provisions, the trade ministers agreed to the following: 1 negotiations on the relationship between existing WTO rules and trade obligations in multilateral environmental agreements MEAs ; 2 procedures for the exchange of information between MEA Secretariats and WTO committees, and the criteria for granting observer status; and 3 the reduction or elimination of trade barriers to environmental goods and services.

Concerning the third negotiating objective, the United States and the European Union unveiled a two-tiered tariff elimination proposal on November 30, The first tier would be the elimination on tariffs on 43 goods and services directly related to climate change mitigation such as wind-turbine parts, solar collectors, and hydrogen fuel cells. All countries would be obliged to take on this mandate, although certain phase-in periods are contemplated for developing and least-developed countries.

The second phase would be the creation of a plurilateral Environmental Goods and Services Agreement EGSA that would liberalize additional environmental-related goods and services among developed and advanced developing countries. However, this proposal has been criticized by several developing countries. Brazil has decried the omission of biofuels from the list, as well as biofuel production equipment.

India has questioned the inclusion of certain 'dual-use' goods, those that also have non-environmental uses. Although the executive branch conducts trade negotiations in the WTO, the Congress has constitutional responsibility for regulation of U. As part of this constitutional role, Congress conducts oversight of the negotiations. Oversight might be in the forms of hearings or meetings with executive branch officials. Members often communicate their positions through public statements and letters.

In December , for example, the chairmen and ranking Members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee wrote to then-President Bush to urge him to resist a possible year-end WTO Ministerial, maintaining that "developed and advanced developing countries must commit to provide meaningful new market access opportunities if Congress is to support a deal.

In the Trade Act of P. These objectives gave direction to negotiators on U. Congress also outlined requirements that the executive branch must meet, as a condition for expedited procedures for legislation to implement trade agreements, including those reached in the Doha Development Agenda.

Among the conditions for expedited legislative procedures, the executive branch must consult with Congress at various stages of the negotiations, notify Congress before taking specified actions, and submit reports as outlined. It is unclear whether the Administration will ask for TPA in its second term, or whether the th Congress would be inclined to grant it. Trade and Implications for U.

Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U. January The Singapore issues refer to negotiating topics brought up by the European Union at the Singapore Ministerial in as topics for the next round of negotiations.

They consisted of investment, government procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy. An informal group of 20 sometimes joined by others developing countries that emerged as a negotiating block in the Doha talks.

Not to be confused with the G forum of leading economic powers. Trade , June 30, Trade , August 1, Group of Susan C. Trade , July 28, International Trade Commission. Publication August Brown, Drusilla K. Discussion Paper No. School of Public Policy. The University of Michigan. December 8, Thomas W. The different outcomes in these studies are due substantially to differing assumptions concerning liberalization resulting from the Doha Round as well as from differences in the econometric models themselves.

For example, the World Bank studies do not attempt to quantify services liberalization. Agriculture , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Trade , October 5, Goals , by [author name scrubbed].

Trade , December 23, Trade , June 22, Trade , August 15, November 13, In determining dumping margins, zeroing refers to a calculation whereby only goods sold in the export market at less than the domestic market price are counted; goods sold in the export market at higher than domestic price are assigned a value of zero, thus tending to increase the dumping margin.

Critical on Zeroing," Inside U. Trade , December 26, Trade , December 7, Topic Areas About Donate. As much as people tout new issues in trade negotiations, there are few initiatives more beneficial than removing tariffs. Currently, a similar deal on tariff reductions for environmental goods is being negotiated.

Along the same lines, the trade in services talks going on in Geneva could be brought formally into the WTO framework. But more generally, putting aside the question of the best strategic approach, there is a fundamental question for governments: Are you willing to address your own protectionism? If the answer is no, the whole process may be doomed from the outset and is not worth the time and effort.

It may be possible to reach a trade deal, but the liberalization in it is unlikely to be significant. In this regard, bilateral and regional trade deals have proliferated, but their tariff reductions and services liberalization are preferential i. While such deals may have political value, their economic benefits are limited. It is up to the governments, then, where they want to drive it. But the reality is, the WTO cannot liberalize trade unless governments want to do so.

Unfortunately, every government seems to have a reason why its own agriculture subsidies or other sacrosanct protectionism should be excluded from disciplines. The focus is always on addressing the kinds of protectionism that others engage in. With that attitude, though, real trade liberalization becomes almost impossible to achieve.

Losing the WTO as an effective forum for trade liberalization would be a setback for free trade. Despite its existing successes, there is much more the WTO could achieve, as trade liberalization is most beneficial when carried out multilaterally. It is therefore in the interests of all governments to make the WTO work by committing to trade liberalization in relation to their own protectionism.

For example, Brazil has been accused of subsidizing its sugar industry. Most of the remaining tariff lines will be completely phased out in four stages over three years. This means that by almost all imports of the relevant products will be duty free. See generally, Office of the U. Live Now. Notes 1. Download the Free Trade Bulletin. About the Author. Page Contents. Faizel Ismail does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Fifteen years ago the Doha round of trade negotiations was launched, creating much needed hope that the multilateral trade system carved under the banner of the World Trade Organisation WTO would at last be made to work for the benefit of all members. But those hopes remain dashed. Negotiations have run into the ground, with no progress being made since December And there are no signs of a resolution.

This must rank as a major crisis and a threat to world peace. The Doha round was the first to end in failure. The GATT arrangement was deficient in many ways. It failed to open the markets of the rich countries to the agriculture and textiles products produced in poor countries. It nevertheless provided the world with a basic framework for the multilateral trading system.

It succeeded in preventing trade competition between nations from descending into conflict on the scale of the First and Second World Wars. Trade tensions between nation states that could lead to conflict are once again beginning to sharpen.

This is particularly the case given the multi-polar world that has emerged in the 21st century and the rise of emerging countries, such as China, India and Brazil.